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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to §§78A-3-102 and 78A-4-103, Utah Code 
Annotated, and the Order of the Utah Supreme Court transferring this case to this court for 
disposition. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The standards of review applicable to the issue raised under defendant's Issue #1 are as 
follows. 
A denial of a motion to vacate a judgment under rule 60(b) is ordinarily reversed 
only for an abuse of discretion. However, when a motion to vacate a judgment is 
based on a claim of lack of jurisdiction, the district court has no discretion: if 
jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment cannot stand without denying due process to 
the one against whom it runs. Therefore, the propriety of the jurisdictional ' 
determination, and hence the decision not to vacate, becomes a question of law 
upon which we do not defer to the district court. 
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, p , 2 P.3d 451, 454. 
<i 
Additionally, "A trial court has discretion in determining whether a movant has shown 
Rule 60(b) grounds, and this Court will reverse the trial court's ruling only when there has been 
an abuse of discretion."' Id at 110, If 9. < 
Where the trial court relies only on documentary evidence to determine whether 
jurisdiction exists, "If there are no material disputes in the documentary evidence, the appellate 
J 
court reviews the matter de novo to determine whether as a matter of law jurisdiction exists. 
Kamdar & Co. v. Laray Co., Inc., 165 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 815 P.2d 245, 248. 
Contrary to defendant's assertion, the issue set forth under defendant's Issue #1 was not ( 
preserved in the trial court, and in fact was not even raised before the trial court. 
I 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, 
etc. 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could 
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) 
fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or 
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment 
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the 
judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(b) How presented. 
Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive 
pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the 
option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject 
matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) 
insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. 
A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further 
pleading is permitted. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. 
A party waives all defenses and objections not presented either by motion or by 
answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an indispensable party, and the 
objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later 
pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the 
trial on the merits, and except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the 
2 
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parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court 
shall dismiss the action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be 
disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have 
been received. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Statement of Relevant Facts, 
The following are the facts applicable to this case, as supported by the Affidavit of Gary 
G. Kuhlmann in Opposition to Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and documents attached 
thereto, Record ("Rec") at pages 46 - 63, a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum A, 
and the Findings, Conclusions and Order of the trial court, Rec. at pages 94 -100, a copy of 
which is attached as Addendum 5 to the Brief of Appellant. To avoid unnecessary repetition, 
reference to the record shall be to Appellees' Addendum A and Appellant's Addendum 5 where 
applicable. j 
1. The complaint was filed in the trial court on August 16, 2007, and was served 
upon the defendant on August 20, 2007. Rec. at pp. 1-18. 
2. During September, 2007, plaintiffs' counsel, Gary Kuhlmann, was contacted by 
Sharon Nelson, attorney for the defendant. Ms. Nelson requested an extension of time to answer 
the complaint. She informed Mr. Kuhlmann that she believed her client was not liable to the 
plaintiffs because her client had purchased the involved dealership after the sale of the 
motorhome at issue in this case to the plaintiffs. Addendum A at p. 2, ^ 3; Addendum 5 at p. 2, 
1fl!3-4. 
3 
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3. In mid-September5 2007, Mr. Kuhlmann agreed to grant Ms. Nelson an extension 
to allow her a short time to provide Mr. Kuhlmann with evidence that her client was not the 
proper party in the case. Addendum A at p. 2, ^ 4; Addendum 5 at p. 2, f 5. 
4. After not hearing from or receiving information from Ms. Nelson, Mr. 
Kuhlmann's office contacted Ms. Nelson's office by phone on October 15, 2007, and demanded 
that the requested information be provided or an answer filed. Addendum A at p. 2, <fl 5; 
Addendum, 5 at p. 2, f^ 6. 
5. On October 30, 2007, Mr. Kuhlmann received a fax from Ms. Nelson containing a 
two page Bill of Sale which was apparently part of a larger contract. Addendum A at p. 2, ^ 6; 
Addendum 5 at p. 7. 
6. On that same date, Mr. Kuhlmann's office responded to Ms. Nelson's fax and 
informed her that to evaluate the matter, and determine who was responsible for the dealership 
liabilities, Mr. Kuhlmann would need to receive the Purchase Agreement and other documents 
related to the alleged sale of the dealership. Addendum A at p. 2, f 7; Addendum 5 at p. 3, ^  8. 
7. On November 1, 2007, Mr. Kuhlmann received a second fax from Ms. Nelson 
requiring that Mr. Kuhlmann sign a confidentiality agreement before any further documents 
would be provided. The demand was for a general confidentiality agreement and was not limited 
to financial or proprietary matters. Addendum A at p. 2, ^ 8; Addendum 5 at p. 3, f 9. 
8. Mr. Kuhlmann refused to sign the confidentiality agreement since it was the 
defendant that was requesting that the defendant be dismissed from the case and because to do so 
could prejudice the plaintiff in using the information in the purchase documents in the case in the 
trial court. Addendum 5 at p. 3, |^ 10. 
4 
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9. After receiving no further information and having no further contact with Ms. 
Nelson, on November 27, 2007, Mr. Kuhlmann, by letter, advised Ms. Nelson that plaintiffs 
would be seeking the entry of default and default judgment. Addendum A at p. 2, f 9; 
Addendum 5 at p. 3, ^  11. 
10. An Application for Entry of Default and a Motion for Entry of Default Judgment 
were filed with the court on November 27, 2007. Rec. at pp. 19 - 22. 
11. A Default Certificate was entered on December 3,2007, and Default Judgment 
was entered on December 4, 2007. Rec. at pp. 23 - 25. 
12. Despite having been advised that the plaintiffs would be seeking a default 
judgment and being provided with a copy of the Application for Entry of Default, the defendant's 
attorney took no action to prevent the entry of default. Addendum A at p. 3, % 12; Addendum 5 
at p. 3, If 14. 
13 On December 19, 2007, Mr. Kuhlmann received a phone call from William 
Frazier, the new attorney for the defendant. Mr. Frazier asked if Mr. Kuhlmann would be willing 
to stipulate to set aside the default judgment based upon his assertion that his client had 
purchased the business after the plaintiffs purchase of the motorhome at issue. While Mr. 
Kuhlmann refused to simply stipulate to set aside the default without some evidence of the 
factual assertions of defendant's counsel, Mr. Kuhlmann relayed to Mr. Frazier a continuing 
willingness to review any documents Mr. Frazier would like to provide, and emphasized Mr. 
Kuhlmann's frustration with prior defense counsel's failure to provide any type of 
documentation as previously promised. At the end of this conversation, Mr. Frazier informed 
Mr. Kuhlmann that he would obtain and provide Mr. Kuhlmann with documentation to show that 
5 
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Mr. Frazier's client was not the proper defendant in this matter. Addendum A at p. 3, ^  13; 
Addendum 5 at pp. 3 - 4, ffl[ 15 -17. 
14. Despite being told yet again that Mr. Kuhlmann would be provided certain 
documents by the defendant, no further documents were provided and no further contact from 
defendant's attorneys occurred until February 27, 2008. On that date Mr. Kuhlmann received a 
voice-mail message from defendant's counsel simply indicating that he would be filing a Motion 
to Set Aside Default Judgment. Addendum A at pp. 3 - 4, U 14; Addendum 5 at p. 4, ffi[ 18 - 19. 
15. Despite being told repeatedly that Mr. Kuhlmann would be receiving certain 
documents for review, the same were never provided by defendant. Addendum A at p. 4, If 15. 
16. The defendant filed its Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment on February 29, 
2008, four days shy of three months from the date of entry of the Default Judgment. Addendum 
5 at p. 4, Tf 20; Rec. at pp. 30 - 33. 
17. The defendant was afforded over three months to provide the plaintiffs with the 
documents requested by plaintiffs or to file an answer. Addendum 5 at p. 4, f 21. 
18. The only evidence provided to the trial court to try to demonstrate the existence of 
a meritorious defense were the conclusory statements of defendant's counsel that: 
a. The evidence will show that plaintiffs have sued the wrong party. 
b. Defendant did not own the subject dealership when the plaintiffs 
purchased the recreational vehicle. 
c. Defendant will be able to demonstrate that it is not the proper party, and 
that any assertion of personal jurisdiction over defendant is highly questionable. Addendum 5 at 
pp. 4 - 5, K 22. 
6 
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19. At no time did the defendant seek to dismiss the case or have the default judgment 
declared void, but rather sought only to set aside the default judgment in this matter under Rule 
60(b)(1) and (6). Rec. at p. 30 - 33. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The defendant's claim that the default judgment should have been set aside under Rule 
60(b)(4), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, was not raised in the trial court. Rather, the defendant's 
claim for relief was premised only on Rules 60(b)(1) and (6). This court should not review an 
issue raised for the first time on appeal, especially where there is no evidence in the record which 
supports the asserted issue. 
All of the allegations of the plaintiffs complaint were deemed admitted when defendant 
failed to file an answer and the default judgment was entered. Further, the defendant waived any 
defense based upon a lack of personal jurisdiction when it failed to raise such defense in a
 i 
responsive pleading or by motion before filing a responsive pleading. 
After reviewing the defendant's arguments as contained in the defendant's motion and 
I 
hearing the arguments of counsel, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion since 
there was no excusable neglect, surprise, hmdvertence or mistake shown by the defendant. 
Additionally, the defendant, in its motion for relief from the default judgment, failed to even , 
address whether a meritorious defense existed to the plaintiff s claims. 
• • . • < < 
. A 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The Defendant Raises Issues on Appeal which were not Raised in the Trial 
Court nor Properly Preserved for Appeal. 
The defendant asserts that it has disputed personal jurisdiction "in first and all subsequent 
pleadings." Appellant's Brief at p. 12. However, the defendant has never filed a pleading in this 
case. Defendant also asserts that its motion to set aside the default judgment was "brought on the 
grounds that the Trial Court (sic) lacked personal jurisdiction over the Defendant, among other 
grounds." Appellant's Brief at p. 12. Defendant then claims that the trial court erred by not 
setting aside the default judgment as being void, pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. These assertions by the defendant simply are not true. 
The defendant's claim that the defendant should be granted relief from the default 
judgment based upon the judgment being void was not raised, briefed nor argued in the trial 
court. Since the defendant chose not to provide this court with transcripts of the hearing before 
the trial court, this court is left with only the printed record. The only evidence in such record 
regarding the defendant's claims for relief from the judgment are in the defendant's motion and 
memorandum seeking relief from the default judgment, a copy of which is attached to the 
defendant's brief as Addendum 2, and the accompanying affidavits, copies of which are attached 
to defendant's brief as Addenda 3 and 4. 
As evidenced by the defendant's motion, memorandum and affidavits, the motion was 
specifically "brought pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) and 60 (b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure." Addendum 2 at p. 1. The defendant argued only that "the subject judgment was 
issued subsequent to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, (sic) and excusable neglect." Addendum 2 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
at p. 2. While defendant made certain conclusory and unsupported statements regarding whether 
the defendant was a proper party and claimed that the defendant "has legitimate and valid legal 
defenses, including misjoinder and lack of personal jurisdiction," Addendum 2 at p. 4, nowhere 
in the motion nor the affidavits submitted therewith is there a single fact supporting a dispute of 
personal jurisdiction. In fact, the motion itself indicates that the defendant was not raising such 
issue by the motion but wished to have the judgment set aside because "Defendant will be able to 
demonstrate that.. . any assertion of personal jurisdiction over Defendant is highly questionable. 
. . ." Addendum 2 at p. 4. 
The "Conclusion" of the defendant's motion and memorandum is perhaps the most 
telling. In such conclusion, the defendant does not request that the court dismiss the case for lack 
of jurisdiction or find the judgment void due to lack of jurisdiction. Rather, the defendant 
"requests that the Default Judgment entered against it on or about December 5, 2007 be set aside, 
due to mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, (sic) and surprise." Addendum 2 at p. 4. Thus, 
the issue of whether the judgment was void under Rule 60(b)(4), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
was never raised in the trial court, was never briefed by the parties, was never decided by the trial 
court, is raised for the first time in this court, and was not properly preserved for determination 
by this court. 
II. Personal Jurisdiction Over the Defendant has been Admitted and any 
Defense of Lack of Personal Jurisdiction has been Waived. 
Setting aside the default judgment based upon an asserted lack of personal jurisdiction is , 
also unsupported since the defendant has never properly raised the issue, never presented any 
factual basis for such claim, personal jurisdiction has been admitted, and the defendant has 
i 
9 
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waived any defense based upon a lack of personal jurisdiction. While the defendant's brief to 
this court makes several assertions as to why personal jurisdiction is lacking, none are supported 
by any evidence in the record and none were raised in, or presented to, the trial court. The 
defendant did not file an answer disputing the plaintiffs' claims of personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant. Nor did the defendant file a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. At 
the time the defendant filed its only motion, the plaintiffs had already been granted judgment. 
The defendant's failure to contest the allegations of the complaint before default resulted in the 
allegations of the plaintiffs' complaint being admitted. See Cody v. Lowe, 2008 UT App 440, 
2008 Utah App. LEXIS 438, citing Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d 593, 595 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
("When allegations in a complaint are not properly contested by an opposing party, they are 
deemed admitted."); Murdockv. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22,484 P.2d 164, 169 (Utah 1971) 
(Allegations in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required are admitted when not 
denied in a responsive pleading). In this case, the defendant has not filed any responsive 
pleadings in this matter and default was entered. Therefore, all facts of the complaint are deemed 
admitted. 
The defendant's claims regarding personal jurisdiction were also waived by the 
defendant. Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive 
pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the 
option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject 
matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) 
insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. 
A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further 
pleading is permitted. 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Additionally, Rule 12(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
A party waives all defenses and objections not presented either by motion or by 
answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an indispensable party, and the 
objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later 
pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the 
trial on the merits, and except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the 
parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court 
shall dismiss the action. 
Based upon the foregoing, the defendant's failure to raise the defense of lack of personal 
jurisdiction by motion prior to pleading, or in a responsive pleading, constitutes a waiver of such 
defense. The same applies to the defendant's claim that it is not the proper party to this case. In 
Lewis v. Porter, 556 P.2d 496 (Utah 1976), after judgment was entered for the plaintiff, the 
defendant claimed that he should not have been found liable in his individual capacity but in a 
corporate capacity. The court found "Any objection to a defect of the parties is waived, if not 
asserted by a party as provided in Rule 12(h)." Thus, defendant's claim that it is not the right 
party to this action has been waived. 
III. The Trial Court Properly Exercised its Discretion in Denying the 
Defendant's Motion for Relief from the Default Judgment 
Contrary to the defendant's argument, the trial court, after weighing the evidence and 
arguments before it, properly ruled that there was not a sufficient basis for granting the defendant 
relief from the default judgment. In the context of reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion for 
relief from a judgment, the Utah Supreme Court has noted: 
The trial court is endowed with considerable latitude of discretion in granting or 
denying a motion to relieve a party from a final judgment under Rule 60(b)(1), 
U.R.C.P., and this court will reverse the trial court only where an abuse of this 
discretion is clearly established . . . . The rule that the courts will incline towards 
granting relief to a party, who has not had the opportunity to present his case, is 
11 
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ordinarily applied at the trial court level, and this court will not reverse the 
determination of the trial court merely because the motion could have been 
granted. For this court to overturn the discretion of the lower court in refusing to 
vacate a valid judgment, the requirements of public policy demand more than a 
mere statement that a person did not have his day in court when full opportunity 
for a fair hearing was afforded him or his legal representative. 
In order for defendant to be relieved from the default judgment, he must not only 
show that the judgment was entered against him through excusable neglect (or any 
other reason specified in Rule 60(b)), but he must also show that his motion to set 
aside the judgment was timely, and that he has a meritorious defense to the action. 
* * * * 
The latter question [of a meritorious defense] arises only after consideration of the 
first question [of excusable neglect] and a sufficient excuse therefrom being 
shown . . . . Furthermore . . . . it is unnecessary, and moreover inappropriate to 
even consider the issue of meritorious defenses unless the court is satisfied that a 
sufficient excuse has been shown. 
State vs. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1055-1056 (Utah 1983). Based upon the evidence before 
the trial court, and as reflected in the record, it is evident that the trial court did not abuse its 
"considerable latitude of discretion" in denying the defendant's motion. 
A The defendant failed to show mistake, inadvertence, surprise or 
excusable neglect. 
It has been noted in relation to a Rule 60(b) motion that "A prime requisite precedent to 
the granting of such relief is that the movant demonstrate that he comes to the court with clean 
hands and in good faith." Chrysler vs. Chrysler, 303 P.2d 995, 997 (Utah 1956). This, the 
defendant did not do. Defendant asserts that there was continuing dialog between counsel, that 
various documents requested by the plaintiffs were provided by the defendants, and that each 
time documents were provided, plaintiffs' counsel requested additional documents. Appellant's 
Brief at pp. 8 - 9. Defendant also asserts that after plaintiffs' counsel refused to sign a 
12 
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confidentiality agreement, "Plaintiffs' counsel and general counsel for Defendant continued to 
attempt to work through their concerns via correspondence, mainly via facsimile." Appellant's 
Brief at p. 9. Nothing in the record supports these factual assertions. 
Both the affidavits of defendant's general counsel, Sharon Nelson, and the affidavit of 
plaintiffs' counsel, Gary Kuhlmann, show that prior to the entry of default, there was a total of 
five contacts between counsel's offices. In mid September there was a telephone conversation 
between counsel wherein Mr. Kuhlmann told Ms. Nelson that she could have a short extension to 
answer so she could provide Mr. Kuhlmann with documents supporting her claim that the 
defendant was not a proper party to this action. After no contact was received from Ms. Nelson 
for approximately a month, Mr. Kuhlmann advised Ms. Nelson, that she should file an answer or 
provide the requested documents. No response was received from Ms. Nelson for two weeks, at 
which time she sent a fax to Mr. Kuhlmann with a two-page Bill of Sale. That same day, Mr. 
Kuhlmann responded and indicated that the Bill of Sale was not sufficient and that the requested 
documents had to be to Mr. Kuhlmann by the end of business on November 1, 2007. On 
November 1, 2007, Ms. Nelson sent a fax requiring that Mr. Kuhlmann execute a confidentiality 
agreement before any further documents would be provided. Mr. Kuhlmann refused to sign the 
confidentiality agreement and gave the defendant an additional twenty-six days to file an answer 
before seeking a default. No answer nor motion to dismiss was filed during an almost three 
month period. During this time, Ms. Nelson called Mr. Kuhlmann's office once and sent two fax 
transmissions. Communication between counsel was far from "continuing." Additionally, after 
having been given a demand that an answer be filed if the documents were not provided, no 
documents were provided and no answer was filed. 
13 
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In Pacer Sport and Cycle, Inc. vs. Myers, 534 P.2d 616 (Utah 1975), a father had co-
signed a promissory note with his son. When the son failed to make payment, the attorney for 
the plaintiff wrote the father and requested payment. The father refused to pay, claiming that he 
had only signed for the purpose of obtaining credit for his son. The father was later served with a 
summons and complaint. The father called the plaintiffs attorney, stating that he was not liable 
for the debt and that his son was in California. After the plaintiff was unable to find the son, the 
plaintiff took a default judgment against the father. The father then moved to set aside the 
default judgment on the basis that 
he told plaintiffs counsel that the son was the one who should have been sued and 
that the default judgment was not taken until one year after the action was 
commenced. He also claimed that he assumed the action had been taken care of 
and therefore took no steps to file an answer to the complaint. 
Id. at 617. In determining whether such claims justified setting aside the default, the court found 
"none of these claims even approaches 'excusable neglect' as required under Rule 60(b), 
U.R.C.P., in order to be relieved from a default judgment." Id. The same is true in this case. 
Simply claiming that the defendant is the wrong party and then taking no further action does not 
support setting aside the default judgment. 
After reviewing the evidence and hearing the arguments of counsel in the instant case, the 
trial court found: 
5. Defendant has asserted no basis for finding the existence of 
mistake or inadvertence in this case but rather relies on the claims of excusable 
neglect and surprise. 
6. Defendant did not exercise due diligence in this matter since an 
answer could have been filed by the defendant at anytime during the more than 
three months between that date the Complaint was served and the date the default 
was entered. Nothing prevented the defendant from filing such Answer and there 
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were no circumstances outside the control of the defendant which rendered the 
defendant unable to file an Answer. An Answer was not filed simply because the 
defendant chose not to do so. Based thereon, the defendant has failed to show the 
existence of excusable neglect in this case. 
7. The defendant has further failed to establish the existence of 
surprise. Defendant's counsel was told that only a short time would be given to 
provide the documents requested by plaintiffs' counsel and defendant failed to 
provide such documents. Further, the defendant was informed that the plaintiff 
was seeking a default and a copy of the Application for Entry of Default was 
provided to defendant's counsel. Nevertheless, no action was taken by defendant 
to prevent or overcome a default being entered until almost three months after the 
default judgment was entered. 
Addendum 5 at p. 6. After reviewing the evidence from the record, it cannot be said that the trial 
court abused its discretion. 
B. The defendant failed to establish a meritorious defense. 
Even if it were arguable that the defendant has established the existence of excusable 
neglect or surprise, the defendant has failed, both in the trial court and before this court, to 
establish the existence of a meritorious defense. Indeed, the issue of a meritorious defense as a 
requirement of relief under Rule 60(b) is not even addressed in the defendant's brief. As stated 
in State vs. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983) 
A meritorious defense is one which sets forth specific and sufficiently detailed 
facts which, if proven, would have resulted in a judgment different from the one 
entered. Defendant must therefore do more than merely dispute or deny the truth 
of plaintiffs' allegations; he must set forth specific facts showing meritorious 
defenses to those allegations in order to have the default judgment set aside. 
/J. at 1057-1058. 
Reviewing the record clearly establishes that the defendant's motion and supporting 
affidavits contain no more than cursory statements that the plaintiffs have sued the wrong party, 
that the defendant did not own the subject dealership when the plaintiffs purchased their 
15 
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motorhome, and that the plaintiffs have failed to show a proper basis for personal jurisdiction. 
The motion and affidavits contain no facts whatsoever, much less a statement of specific and 
sufficiently detailed facts, showing a meritorious defense. As the trial court found 
The defendant has failed to provide the Court with any "specific and sufficiently 
detailed facts which, if proven, would have resulted in a judgment different from 
the one entered." Thus, even if the Court were to find the existence of a mistake, 
inadvertence, excusable neglect or surprise, the defendant's motion is deficient 
and should be denied. 
Addendum 5 at pp. 6 -7. Clearly such a finding by the trial court was not an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above, the plaintiffs respectfully request that the court affirm the trial 
court's findings, conclusions and order entered June 25, 2008, denying the defendant's motion 
for relief from the default judgment, and that the court award the plaintiffs their costs and 
attorney fees incurred herein. 
o / ^ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this^Y day of December, 2008. 
J a r y ^ l 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that on this?__ day of December, 2008,1 mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to: William E. Frazier, LAW OFFICES OF STEVEN R BANGERTER, 720 S. 
River Rd., Suite A-200, St. George, UT 84790. 
mann 
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GARY G. KUHLMANN & ASSOCIATES, PC
 B Y ^¥1— 
Gary G. Kuhlmann (#4994) 
Attorney for Petitioner 
107 South 1470 East, Suite 105 
P.O. Box 910387 
St. George, Utah 84791-0387 
Telephone: (435)656-6156 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM JUDSON and DONNA 
JUDSON, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v . • . 
WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, LLC, a ] 
Nevada foreign limited liability company, ] 
dba WHELLER' S LAS VEGAS RV, 
Defendant. ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF GARY G. KUHLMANN 
) IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO SET 
) ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 070501867 
I Judge Eric A. Ludlow 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
Gary G. Kuhlmann, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am a member in good standing of the Utah State Bar and am attorney for the 
plaintiffs in the above-captioned action. I am competent to testify to all matters contained herein. 
2. A Complaint in the above-captioned matter was filed on August 16, 2007, and 
was served upon the defendant on August 30, 2007. 
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3. During September, 2007,1 was contacted by Sharon Nelson, attorney for the 
defendant. Ms. Nelson requested an extension of time to answer the Complaint. She informed 
me that her client had purchased the dealership at issue after the sale of a motorhome to the 
plaintiffs and was not responsible for the plaintiffs' claims in this case. 
4. In mid-September, 2007,1 agreed to grant Ms. Nelson an extension to allow her a 
short time to provide me with evidence that her client was not the proper party in this case. 
5. After not hearing from or receiving information from Ms. Nelson, my office 
contacted her office by phone on October 15, 2007, and demanded that the requested information 
be provided or an answer filed. 
6. October 30,2007,1 received a fax from Ms. Nelson containing a Bill of Sale, a 
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
7. On that same date, my office responded to Ms. Nelson's fax and informed her that 
to evaluate the matter, we would need to receive the Purchase Agreement and other documents 
related to the alleged sale of the dealership. A true and correct copy of our response is attached 
as Exhibit B. 
8. On November 1, 2007,1 received a second fax from Ms. Nelson requiring that I 
sign a confidentiality agreement before any further documents would be provided, a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
9. After receiving no further information and having no further contact with Ms. 
Nelson, on November 27,2007,1 advised Ms. Nelson that we would be seeking the entry of 
default and default judgment. A copy of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit D. 
9 
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10. An Application for Entry of Default, and Motion for Entry of Default Judgment 
were filed with the court on November 27,2007. 
11. A Default Certificate was entered on December 3, 2007, and Default Judgment 
was entered on December 4, 2007. 
12. Despite having been advised that the plaintiffs would be seeking a default 
judgment and being provided with a copy of the Application for Entry of Default, the defendant's 
attorney took no action to prevent the entry of default. 
13. On December 19, 2007,1 received a phone call from William Frazier, the new 
attorney for the defendant. Mr. Frazier asked if I would be willing to stipulate to set aside the 
default judgment based upon his assertion that his client had purchased the business after the 
plaintiffs purchase of the motorhome at issue. While I refused to simply stipulate to set aside 
the default without some evidence of the same, I relayed to Mr. Frazier my continuing 
willingness to review any documents he would like to provide but emphasized my frustration 
with prior counsel's failure to provide any type of documentation as previously promised. At the 
end of our conversation, Mr. Frazier informed me that he would be obtaining and would provide 
me with documentation to show that his client was not the proper defendant in this matter. A 
copy of an email evidencing this conversation is attached hereto as Exhibit E. 
14. Despite being told yet again that I would be provided certain documents by the 
defendant, I received no further documents and had no further contact with the defendant's 
attorneys until February 27,2008. On that date I received a voice-mail message from 
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defendant's counsel simply indicating that he would be filing a Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment. 
15. Despite being told repeatedly that I would be receiving certain documents for 
review, the same have never been provided. 
Dated this2<^L-day of March, 2008. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ?)-4 day of March, 2008. 
LlfAT. BUNTING 
Notary Public 
State of Utah 
My Commission Expires 
^ M S E ^ w e e ^ u m ^ , st George, UT 84790 
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401 North Buffalo prWt, Snitt 210 
Las Vegas, -Nevada 8914S 
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FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL SHEET 
TO: FROM: 
GaryG.Kuhlmaim Celeste Mariscal 
Paralegal for Sharon Nelson 
COMPANY! 
FAX NUMDBU; 
435-634-1398 
PHONE NUMBER: 
DATE: 
October 30,2007 
TOTAL NO. OF FAtfES INCLUDING CQVRR; 
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SENDER'S ftEFEKENCE NUMBER: 
RE: YOUR REFERENCE NUMBER; 
Judson v, Wheeler's RV 
D URGENT K l FOR REVIEW • PLEASE COMMENT Q PLEASE REPLY Q PLEASE RECYCLE 
NOTES/COMMENTS 
Attached is the Bill of Sale and Assignment 
The in format ion contained in th i s t r a n s m i s s i o n is c o n f i d e n t i a l . It is in tended o n l y for the 
i d e n t i f i e d r e c i p i e n t and may conta in a t t o r n e y / c l i e n t or work product mater ia !* . If the 
reader o f t i l ls t ransmiss ion i* not the in t ended r e c i p i e n t , any r e v i e w or d i s s e m i n a t i o n o f 
this c o m m u n i c a t i o n is s t r i c t l y p r o h i b i t e d , If th i s c o m m u n i c a t i o n has been s e n t to you in 
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BILL OF SALE AND ASSIGNMENT 
By this Bill of Sale and Assignment given on the date set forth below by LJVJELV. JNG, a 
Nevada corporation ("Seller") and JACK TOO, LLC, A Nevada limited liability company 
(together with Seller, 'the "Sellers*') for and in consideration of the purchase price provided in the 
Asset Purchase Agreement between Sellers and Buyer dated as of November 29, 2004 (the 
"Purchase Agreement") in hand paid by WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, LLC, a Minnesota limited 
liability company ("Buyer"), the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged* Sellers 
hereby sell, bargain, assign, transfer and convey to Buyer all of the Assets as defined in the Purchase 
Agreement, including but not limited to the following: 
(a) Recreation Vehicle Inventory, The RV Vehicle as defined in the Purchase 
Agreement. 
(b) Farts and Accessories. The Parts and Accessories Inventory as defined in 
the Purchase Agreement, 
(o) Working... Capital The Working Capital as defined in the Purchase 
Agreement. 
(d) fignifaifs. Fixtures. Equipment and Leasehold Improvements, The Fixed 
Assets as defined in the Purchase Agreement. 
(e) Supplies, The Other Inventories as defined in the Purchase Agreement, 
(f) Work in Process. The Work in Process as defined in the Purchase 
Agreement, 
(g) Intangible Assets and Seller's Regards,._.Customer Lists ..and_. Files, 
Relinquishment of Franchise, The Intangible Assets as defined in the Purchase 
Agreement. 
(h) Contract Rights. The Contract Rights as defined in the Purchase 
Agreement. 
, 0) Orders and Customer Advances. The Sales Orders as defined in the 
Purchase Agreement. 
Q) Miscellaneous Assets, All other assets, rights and properties relating to 
the Business, including but not limited to choses in action, 
To have and to hold the same unto Buyer and its legal representatives, successors and 
assigns, forever and free and clear of any and all liens, security interests, claims, encumbrances and 
demands of any kind or nature whatsoever or by or of any other person or entity. 
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Each Seller, for itself and legal representatives, successors or assigns, covenants; to and with 
Buyer, and its legal representatives, successors or assigns, that each Seller is the lawful owner of the 
described property; that each Seller has good right to sell the same; and that each Seller will warrant 
and defend the same of said property, assets, rights, goods, chattels and instruments hereby made 
unto Buyer and its legal representatives, successors or assign, against the claims and demands of 
every kind or type of any and all persons whatsoever* except as may be limited or otberwiae 
provided in the Purchase Agreement, 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Seller has caused tins instrument to be executed by its duly 
authorized representative as of the?/^ day of March, 20Q5, 
SELLERS: 
L,V.R,V.,INC 
Marlene S. Wheeler, President 
W LQ-K^JL-LL^ 
Marlene S. Wheeler, Member 
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ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
SENT VIA FACSIMILE 
October 30, 2007 
Sharon Nelson 
401 North Buffalo Drive, Suite 210 
Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 
Fax:(702)737-4529 
Re: Judson vs. Wheeler's RV 
Dear Ms. Nelson: 
We are in receipt of the Bill of Sale and Assignment that you faxed to our office 
regarding the above-referenced matter. However, this does not satisfy Mr. Kuhlmann's request 
for all documents related to the sale. Please note that the Purchase Agreement, and all other 
documents related to the sale, must be received in our office by close of business (5:00 PM Utah 
time) on Thursday, November 1, 2007. 
If you have any questions, please contact our office. 
Sincerely, 
GARY G. KUHLMANN & ASSOCIATES, PC 
C^yf^f^i 
Lisa T. Ranting // 
Paralegal 1/ 
Office 435-656-6156 • Fax 435-634-1398 
107 South 1470 East • Suite 105 • St. George, UT 84790 
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FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL SHEET 
TO: 
Gtfjy G. Kuhknaan 
RB; 
Judson v. Wheeled RV 
FROM; 
Lara Feldstcin 
COMPANY: 
FAX NUMBER: 
435-634-1398 
PHONE NUMBEft: 
Paralegal for Sharon L. Nelsan 
PATE: 
November 1,2007 
TOTAL NO. OF ?AGfiS INCLUDING COVER: 
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SENDER'S REPEftliNCE NUNfBER: 
YOURTIEFRRRNCE NUMBER: 
• URCxENT • FOR REVIEW [ [ ] PLEASE COMMENT D PLEASE RRPJ..Y H PLEASE RECYCLE 
NOTES/COMMENTS; 
Plc^e see attached correspondence. 
The information contained in this transmission is CDrifidcntial. It j s intended only for the 
identified recipient and may contain altorncy/clicnl or work product materials. If the 
reader of this transmission is not the intended recipient, any review or dissemination of 
this communication is strictly prohibited. If this communication has been sent to you in 
c r rn r n Ifin&e n n r i f v lie rrtlmpriiaffilv <if f7f)7,l ^ i T . i ^ ^ O 
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November 1, 2007 
Writcfs email address: 
ftnelson@nelsonlaTvlv.com 
VIA FACSIMILE ONLY 
435*434-1398 
Gary G. Kuhlmann 
Gary G, Kuhlmann & Associates PC 
Attorneys at Law 
.107 South 1470 East, Suite 105 
St. George, UT 84790 
RE: Judson v. Wheeler's RV 
Dear Mr-Kuhlmamti: 
This correspondence is in response to your paralegal., Lisa 
T. Bunting's facsimile dated October 30, 2007 in which you 
requested further documentation with regards to the "Purchase 
Agreement and all other documents related to the sale." 
Our client has requested that you sign a confidentiality 
agreement before releasing the Asset Acquisition Agreement 
documents to you, as they contain sensitive and confidential 
materials. Please contact our office if you are agreeable to this 
condition. 
In the meantime, should you have any questions, 
comments, or concerns, do not hesitate to contact our office. 
Very truly yours, 
SLN/lmf 
cc: client. 
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& ASSOCIATES PC 
ATTOENEYS AT LAW 
November 27, 2007 
Sharon Nelson 
401 North Buffalo Drive, Suite 210 
Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 
Fax:(702)737-4529 
Re: Judson vs. Wheeler's RV 
Dear Ms. Nelson: 
Over two months ago, you requested that I consider dismissing the complaint against your 
client in the above-referenced matter. I agreed to review any information regarding the purported 
sale of the business by your client. I have been trying for over two months to get that 
information. We have no obligation, and do not intend, to sign any non-disclosure or other 
document, since it is your client who is trying to convince us to dismiss this case. Because, to 
date, I have not received the information requested, we have filed for the entry of default 
judgment. A copy of our Application for Entry of Default is enclosed. 
Sincerely, 
GARY G. KUBLMANNp& ASSOCIATES, PC 
Enclosure 
Office 435-656-6156 • Fax 435-634-1398 
1 r\rr C^^fV. -i /Liyn •Rlacf • Q u i f o m . ^ • ft* Clan-ntTf* TTT ft4^9ft 
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To:<kuhllaw@infowest.com> 
C i l U - ^.Contact Info - Judson v. b u D j e c t . w h e e ( e r R V 
c c „
mSteven Bangerter1" 
<bangerterlaw@infowest.com> 
n ^ . W e d , 19 Dec 2007 13:05:32 
u a t e
" - 0 7 0 0 
Status:Normal 
."W. Frazier" From: <wfrazier@infowest.com> 
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Attachments:default.htm 
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List B o o k 
Mr. Kuhlman: 
Thank you for taking the time to speak with me today. I am just becoming 
acquainted with the case, and will endeavor to have more meaningful and 
substantive discussions upon my receipt of documents related to the underlying 
dispute. My contact info is as follows: 
William Frazier 
Law Offices of Steven R. Bangerter 
720 S. River Rd., Suite A-200 
St. George, UT 84790 
(435) 628-7004 phone 
(435)673-1964 fax 
I look forward to working with you. 
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